Brick by Brick

Wednesday, June 28, 2006

Contagious Complexity and Breathtaking Insolvency

Every once in a while a report comes out from a government agency that’s so unassumingly candid you're forced to admit a mistake has been made and that the document was mistakenly leaked, or that its author will soon be fired.

I couldn't help thinking something like that when I read the remarks of Emil W. Henry, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. You can find his entire speech here. But for the purposes of brevity I've excerpted the key passages below.

And if you want the even briefer version here it is: the large size of GSE mortgage portfolios (about US$1.5 trillion), coupled with the lack of market discipline at correctly pricing the risk of GSE debt, multiplied by the interconnectivity of the world's financial institutions has led to a possibility "without precedent." Henry ads that, "Financial markets across the board would likely become very illiquid and volatile as firms with significant losses attempted to unwind their positions."

Notice he said attempted. Here are some more excerpts. Emphasis added is mine, with some sideline commentary interspersed:

  • At the outset, let me be clear on the meaning of systemic risk: it is the potential for the financial distress of a particular firm or group of firms to trigger broad spillover effects in financial markets, further triggering wrenching dislocations that affect broad economic performance. Perhaps a useful analogy is to think about system risk as an illness that can be come highly contagious...

  • The hard lesson from LTCM include: i) the danger of investment decisions which rely upon the presumption of liquidity, ii) the importance of transparency and disclosure, iii) the extent of the interdependence of our global markets, financial firms, investors, and businesses, iv) the fact that complexity is sometimes the enemy of stability, v) the danger of complacency and false confidence in hedging strategies which, by definition, can never hedge out all risk and which can produce the opposite effect in the absence of liquidity

Complexity is sometimes the enemy of stability, but not always. For example, an arrangement where interest rate risk is not "aggregated" to the balance of the GSEs would be more "complex." But it would also be more stable because the stability of the financial markets and the guarantee of liquidity would not depend on the solvency of two poorly run companies that are engaged in the kind of risk management that's far too complex for one single firm.

In other words, a division of labor in interest-rate risk management, though more complex, would be more stable and more efficient. Centralization loses again. But just what kind of risk are we talking about here?

  • There are numerous levels of risk presented by the mortgage investment portfolios, but at a basic level the risk is created as follows: GSE portfolios are comprises primarily of fixed-rate mortgages, either held as whole loans, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), or other mortgagerelated mortgagess Whilemortgagess in the U.S. typically allow borrowers the option to prepay at will, the aggregation of fixed-rate mortgages requires that the investor develop strategies to mitigate risks presented by these uncertain cash flows--both prepayments and extensions. Unless the portfolios are hedged properly, in a period of significant interest rate movement, there is the risk to the GSEs that their assets and liabilities will be quickly become broadly mismatched which can lead to insolvency--much like the dynamics of the S&L crisis.

It's both refreshing and astonishing for a public official to state what has been plainly obvious for three years now: the GSEs could be come insolvent, and take a lot of people with them. It is not just the idle musings of congenital doom-mongering pessimists like myself. But how might it happen? Henry continues:

  • There are three primary ways that the GSEs uniquely impose systemic risk on our financial system. Taken individually, each reason might not be a cause for dramatic action. However, aggregating each of these attributes under a single entity that also carries with it the broad misperception of a government backstop or a guarantee creates a perfect storm scenario.

    The first element is the size of the GSEs investment portfolio's. Today, combined GSE investment portfolios still total almost $1.5 trillion...

    Secondly, the GSEs are not subject to the same degree of market discipline as other large mortgage investors. That lack of market discipline is reflected in preferential funding rates that result directly from the market's long-standing false belief that the U.S. government guarantees or stands behind GSE debt.

    The third element is the level of interconnectivity between the GSE's mortgage investment activities and the other key players in our Nation's financial system. In comparison to bank tier-1 capital, GSE debt obligations exceeded 50 percent of capital for 54 percent of these commercial banks, and GSE debt obligations exceeded 100 percent of capital for 34 percent of these commercial banks. IN addition, the GSE's interest rate positions are highly concentrated and pose significant risks to a number of large financial institutions.

Three risks then. Large size, lack of market discipline, and "high degree of connections throughout our financial system." What could it lead to?

  • Systemic events can unfold by direct and/or indirect spillovers. Direct spillovers arise when the failure of a particular firm creates substantial losses for those who carry direct exposure with such firm, such as its creditors. Indirect spillovers typically develop, not from direct exposures to the firm at the epicenter of the crisis, but when this firm causes a lack of confidence leading to a sense of panic and turbulence that results in action that generates substantial losses for firms that were not directly related to impaired firm. Such spillover - not the initial event - typically take the greatest toll on economic activity, and in the case of the GSEs, the potential for both direct and indirect spillover effects is nothing short of breathtaking.

Interest rate shocks DO happen. Henry points out that:

  • If such an interest rate shock occurred in a way that was not captured by the models [currently in use by market forecasters], the results could be without precedent. The immediate implication would be actual and mark-to-market losses.

What is without precedent is the magnitude of the losses should such an interest rate shock hit the GSEs today. It's not like this hasn't happened before.

  • Has it been so long that we have forgotten Fannie Mae's significant financial troubles in the late 1970s and early 1980s? During this time period, Fannie Mae's balance sheet looked a lot like a savings and loan. As interest rates rose, Fannie Mae's cost of funds rose above the interest rate it was earning on its long-term, fixed rate mortgages. Like many S&Ls, Fannie Mae became insolvent on mark-to-market basis. It lost hundreds of millions of dollars.

If the same thing happens today, you can replace "hundreds of millions" with "trillions."

2 Comments:

  • Well, this piece is interesting.

    However, judging from experience gained from the American S&L debacle of the 1980s and the Japanese "Forever Deflation" experience of the 1990s, my guess is that a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac failure would result in a rush of economists urging a Federal Government bailout similiar to the bailout of the bankrupt S&L industry in 1980s.

    At least that would be my recommendation.

    Which would result in truckloads of 30 year US Treasuries hitting the market.

    Which would imply the Federal Reserve would have to buy them, since the private free market cannot.

    Which would imply the Federal Reserve printing presses would have to work overtime.

    Which would imply inflation in the double digits, similiar to the late 1970s.

    And, of course, the already bankrupt Federal Government would become even more bankrupt, if such a thing is possible...

    By Anonymous Anonymous, at 10:58 AM  

  • Jumping from bailout to inflation is a bit hasty. If there is a need for a bailout, it would come in refinancing GSE debt. As they mature, government/Fed money will be advanced. Those that can't wait will sell GSE debt at a loss.

    Where does inflation come in? Well, obviously, one has to assume that the increase in money in the market will affect the dollar exchange rate. Those holding dollars will have to decide whether to go into Yen or the Euro. Other currencies, too, but they are minor currencies. The ruble? Now, ask yourself, will these countries allow their currencies to appreciate significantly against the dollar and risk a worldwide recession? It is in everyone's interest to keep things steady. Central banks are coordinating their moves. Everything else is for show.

    The fellow who made the speech said, "What can we do about it?. . . . . .we can address this risk rather easily. As long as the portfolios of the GSEs are reduced gradually and responsibly, the overall impact to the housing market should be trivial."

    Gary

    By Anonymous Anonymous, at 8:58 AM  

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